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SENTENCING IN TAX CASES AFTER BOOKER STRIKING THE
RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN UNIFORMITY AND DISCRETION
Scorr A.

IT

I.

SCHUMACHER*

INTRODUCTION

has been nearly ten years since the Supreme Court's seminal decision
in United States v. Booker,' in which the Court invalidated the mandatory
application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 2 In the cases that
followed, the Court addressed subsidiary issues regarding the application
of the Guidelines and the scope of appellate review.3 However, despiteor perhaps because of-these opinions, there is little consensus regarding
the status and extent of appellate review, as well as the discretion afforded
to sentencing courts.4 More troubling, what consensus there is seems to
permitjudges to impose any sentence they wish, as long as the appropriate
sentencing procedures are followed.5 As a result, we are in danger of returning to "the 'shameful' lack of parity, which the Guidelines sought to
remedy."6
The Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing Guidelines were designed to reduce disparity in sentencing and to reign in what one commentator described as a "lawless system."'7 However, the Guidelines, as
ultimately conceived, drastically limited the sentencing judge's ability to
impose a sentence that was appropriate for the conduct and culpability of
* Professor of Law, Director Graduate Program in Taxation, University of
Washington School of Law, Seattle. The author would like to thank Professors
Keith Fogg and Leslie Book, and the participants of the Norman J. Shachoy
Symposium at Villanova University School of Law, as well as Sherry Leyson, Cheryl
Nyberg, and the library staff of the University of Washington School of Law's
Gallagher Law Library for their invaluable research assistance.
1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. Id. at 233.
3. See, e.g., Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009); Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc);
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc); United States v.
Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc).
5. See, e.g., Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 ("[I]f the district court's sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.").
6. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 224 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 65 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3248).
7. See MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAw WITHOUT ORDER 8 (1973)
(describing judges' sentencing power as "effectively subject to no law at all").
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the defendant, creating a different kind of sentencing disparity.8 The current, post-Booker system provides more guidance than the pre-Guidelines
system, but permits sentencing judges to disregard the Guidelines and develop their own sentencing policies. 9 As a result, rather than having a
system that allows for sentences to be tailored to individual defendants, the
current system allows sentences to be imposed based on the penal philosophy of individualjudges.10 This will inevitably lead to unwarranted sentencing disparity."
This Article traces the recent history of criminal
sentencing and argues for a better system that allows for both guidance to
sentencing judges and appropriately individualized sentences. John Rawls
and H. L. A. Hart, in their seminal works on punishment, posited that
there are two questions that must be asked, each at different stages of the
sentencing proceeding. 12 The first question is why do we punish offenders? To that question, Rawls and Hart answer that we punish to deter
others from committing crimes and to protect other members of society. 13
The second question is why do we punish this particular person? The answer to that question is because that person did something wrong and
deserves to be punished. 1 4 They advocate that the first question is relevant to the legislative function, while the second is relevant to the judicial
function at the time of sentencing an offender.1 5
I advocate a sentencing regime where the Sentencing Guidelines provide the starting point for each sentence and are based on the deterrent
policies that are the answer to Rawls and Hart's first question. In tax cases,
that means that the baseline Guidelines sentence should continue to focus
on tax loss and general deterrence.' 6 However, when it comes to sentencing the particular offender, judges should be instructed to sentence the
offender based upon the offender's culpability and personal circumstances. Appellate review of these sentences should require that judges
follow the initial Guidelines but allow variance from the Guidelines range

if it is properly based on the individual characteristics of the defendant. In
this way, sentences will be uniform where it is relevant and will have disparity that is warranted.
Part II of this Article will detail the sentencing procedures prior to the
Sentencing Guidelines and the problems with that regime. In Part III, this
8. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the FederalSentencing Process: The Problem
is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CiuM. L. REv. 833, 851-70 (1992).
9. See United States v. Higdon, 531 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 2008).
10. See id.
11. See infra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
12. See H. L. A. Hart., Prolegonmenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT (Robert M. Baird & Stuart Rosenbaum eds., 1988);John Rawls,
Two Concepts of Rules, in PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 37 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart

Rosenbaum eds., 1988).
13. See Rawls, supra note 12, at 38-39; see also Hart, supra note 12, at 19-20.
14. See Rawls, supra note 12, at 38-39; see also Hart, supra note 12, at 19-20.
15. See Rawls, supra note 12, at 38-39; see also Hart, supra note 12, at 19-20.
16. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

2T1.1 (2012).
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Article will describe the Sentencing Reform Act, the Guidelines, and the
issues that arose as a result of the Guidelines. Part IV will discuss Booker
and its progeny, and it will describe the semi-chaotic current state of sentencing law. Finally, in Part V, I will outline what I view is a better system
that preserves sentencing discretion without rendering the system standardless and lawless. My recommendation, although equally applicable to
any federal sentence, will be examined through the lens of tax sentencing.
II.

SENTENCING PRIOR TO THE GUIDELINES

Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing Guidelines,
federal judges had nearly unfettered discretion in imposing criminal
sentences.17 As long as the sentence was within the statutory range, and
not based upon a constitutionally impermissible basis, the sentence would
not be disturbed.18 Moreover, appeals of sentences were almost non-existent.' 9 Thus, a convicted defendant's sentence was based, at least initially, 20 on the predilections, whims, and philosophy of the sentencing
judge. 2 ' This was not always the case.
A.

A Very Brief History of Pre-GuidelinesSentencing

Prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, judges had very little
discretion in sentencing matters. In the early development of the common law, sentences were imposed to keep what was at times a very fragile
peace, and sentences took the place of the individual's "quest for vengeance."2 2 Thus, retribution was the prevailing theory of punishment,
and justice being a "substitute for vengeance, was brutal." 23 Indeed, most
sentences for felonies in the early common law carried the death penalty. 24 In addition, all felonies carried with them the penalties of "forfeiture of goods and attainder," meaning that the felon's heirs could not
17. See FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 5.

18. See id. at 5-6 (describing range of permissible judicial discretion in
sentencing).
19. See generally ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING To APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (1968) [hereinafter
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES].
20. Under the sentencing rules prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
defendants received indeterminate sentences. Prior to the Act, the amount of
time actually served would depend upon the decision of the Parole Board. For a
discussion of the sentencing rules prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and
the use of the Parole Board's discretion, see infra notes 33-39 and accompanying

text.
21. See FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 8.

22.

ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA

92,

111

(1930).

23. Id. at 92.
24. See generally 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES. Even when the death
penalty was relaxed, the sentences were nevertheless shocking. For misdemeanors,
the usual penalty was pillory and flogging; for petty larceny, ears were cut off; and
for other crimes, branding was imposed. See POUND, supra note 22, at 103.
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succeed to his property or title. 25 When those draconian penalties were
lessened, crimes nevertheless carried a fixed penalty. 2 6 The judge would
supervise the trial or guilty plea, and once guilt was determined, the sentence would follow automatically.27
In the middle of the nineteenth century, penal theories other than
retribution began to influence policy makers. 28 As a result, uniform
sentences began to change, and judges were given the discretion to determine the sentence to be imposed.2 9 This discretion reached its zenith, at
least at the federal level, beginning in the 1910s, when rehabilitation became the predominate theory of punishment, and Congress established
indeterminate sentencing. 30 It was believed that the propensity to commit
a criminal act was a "sickness," akin to mental illness, that could be "cured"
through proper rehabilitation.3 1 As a result, a sentence imposed on a person convicted of a crime should have been no longer than was necessary to
cure or rehabilitate the person. 32 It was, of course, impossible to know at
the time of sentencing exactly how long it would take for the convict to be
cured and ready to re-enter society. Thus, parole boards were established
to make this post-hoc diagnosis.3 3 Under this system, judges could impose
any sentence within the statutory range, with the sentence based upon the
level of culpability or sickness of the defendant. Whether the defendant
served all or even a major portion of that sentence was determined after
the fact by the parole board. As a result, defendants would not know, and
indeed could not know, the length of time they would spend in prison at
the time of their sentencing.
The unfettered discretion of sentencing judges was blessed by the Supreme Court in Williams v. New York. 34 In Williams, the defendant was convicted of murder, and the jury recommended a punishment of life
imprisonment. However, relying, in part, on evidence and facts that were
not submitted to the jury at trial, the judge found that the defendant had
committed other serious crimes and was a "menace to society." 35 The
25. POUND, supra note 22, at 103.
26. See Note, ProceduralDue Process atJudicial Sentencingfor Felony, 81 HARv. L.
REv. 821, 821-22 (1968).
27. See id. at 822.
28. See Michele Pifferi, Individualization of Punishment and the Rule of Law: ReshapingLegality in the United States and EuropeBetween the 19th and the 20th Century, 52
AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 325, 333-34 (2012).
29. See ProceduralDue Process at judicial Sentencing for Felony, supra note 26, at

822.
30. Peter B. Hoffman, History of the Federal Parole System: Part 1 (1910-1972),
FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1997, at 25-27.
31. See Alfred Blumstein, American Prisons in a Time of Crisis, 4 LAw, Soc'Y &
POL'Y 13, 13-14 (Lynne Goodstein & Doris Layton MacKenzie eds., 1989); Michael
Vitiello, ReconsideringRehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REv. 1011, 1016 (1991).
32. See Vitiello, supra note 31, at 1016.
33. See FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 89.
34. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
35. Id. at 244.
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judge sentenced the defendant to death. The defendant appealed, arguing that his due process rights were violated when the judge sentenced
him by relying on facts that were not presented in court and were provided by persons the defendant was not permitted to cross-examine or
confront. The Supreme Court rejected this challenge and held that there
are different evidentiary standards for trial and for sentencing.3 6 Under
the then-prevailing indeterminate sentencing system, discretion was essential to making the appropriately individualized sentence, both at the time
of sentencing and in later proceedings before parole boards.3 7 Moreover,
the Court asserted that the new, "modern" indeterminate sentencing regime usually resulted in a lesser sentence than under the prior system
where judges simply imposed the full sentence for that crime. Judicial
discretion and fact-finding served to benefit offenders and "[i]n general,
these modern changes have not resulted in making the lot of offenders
harder."38 Thus, sentencing judges were not limited to in-court evidence
subject to the normal trial rules. Such a system "would hinder if not preclude all courts-state and federal-from making progressive efforts to
improve the administration of criminal justice."39
B.

Too Much Discretion:A Lawless System

The system of unfettered judicial discretion and indeterminate sentencing came under focused attack in the 1960s and 1970s. 40 Following
the work of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code and the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (Brown Commission), Congress began to reform the federal criminal laws into a more
rational and fair classification of crimes. 4 1 While neither the Model Penal
Code nor the Brown Commission specifically addressed sentencing, those
efforts nevertheless paved the way for comprehensive sentencing
reform.4 2

36. See id. at 248-49.
37. See id. at 249.

38. Id. Of course, the discretion that the sentencing judge exercised certainly
made the lot of Mr. Williams a lot harder. Given that Williams was sentenced to

death, the callousness of the Court's statement is breathtaking.
39. Id. at 251.
40. SeeJohn J. Parker et al., Report to the Judicial Conference of the Committee on
Punishmentfor Crime, FED. PROBATION, July-Sept. 1942, at 41 (raising problems with
sentencing disparity and disparate treatment of offenders).
41. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, FederalCriminalSentencing Reform: Congressand the
United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 291, 294 (1993).
42. See id.
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The source of the most important, and influential,4 3 attack came
from an unlikely source-a United States District Courtjudge.44 In Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order,Judge Marvin E. Frankel set forth, in stark
and vivid detail, the problems with the then-existing sentencing regime.
First, judges could impose any sentence within the statutory limit. Given
the often cavernous range of federal sentences, 45 sentencing judges were
essentially not subject to any law at all.4 6 Frankel noted the maxim that
the United States is a nation of laws, not men. Yet, in the realm of sentencing, the vast discretion affordedjudges created a "regime of such arbitrary fiat [that] would be intolerable in a supposedly free society, to say
nothing of being invalid under our due-process clause." 47
Frankel also noted that in the effort to individualize sentences, the
system is contrary to fundamental concepts of "equality, objectivity, and
consistency in the law." 48 Frankel acknowledged that individualized
sentences were a good thing, but asserted that these sentences should be
made to turn on objective criteria and "not left for [the] determination in
the wide-open, uncharted, standardless discretion of the judge . . . ."49
Thus, the most significant failure of the system was not just the unbridled
discretion given to judges. Rather, it was that this discretion was conferred
without any guidance or standards, save maximum penalties. Some judges
believed that certain crimes called for the maximum penalty by default,
unless the defendant's case warranted mercy, while another judge-perhaps in the same courthouse-believed that the same crimes should receive no jail time, unless they were more serious than normal.5 0
43. Judge Frankel's book was read by Senator Edward Kennedy, who was chair
of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Kennedy and others on the Judiciary Committee sought to implement the reforms urged by Frankel. See Feinberg, supra note
41, at 295. Senator Kennedy, in turn, became an influential voice in the sentencing reform movement, writing extensively on the subject. See, e.g., Edward M. Kennedy, Commentary-The Federal Criminal Code Reform Act and New Sentencing
Alternatives,82 W. VA. L. REv. 423 (1980); Edward M. Kennedy, CriminalSentencing:
A Game of Chance,60 JUDIcATuRE 208 (1976); Edward M. Kennedy, EqualJusticeand

the Problem of Access, 11 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 485 (1978); Edward M. Kennedy, Federal
Criminal Code: An Overview, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 451 (1979); Edward M. Kennedy, Introduction to Symposium on Sentencing, Part 1, 7 HorsTRA L. REv. 1 (1978);
Edward M. Kennedy, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A CongressionalResponse, 8
N.C. CENT. L. REv. 1 (1976); Edward M. Kennedy, Toward a New System of Criminal
Sentencing: Law with Order, Am. CRum. L. REv. Spring 1979, at 353.
44. I say unlikely because the ultimate indictment of the system by Judge
Frankel is that he and his fellow judges have too much discretion and power. It is
unlikely that the powerful will relinquish power.
45. For example, mail fraud has a statutory maximum penalty of twenty years.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). Thus, if convicted, a defendant could face anywhere

from probation to twenty years in prison.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 8.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
See id. at 21.

2014]

TAX SENTENCING AFTER BooKER

569

Accordingly, "individualized sentencing" came to mean not that the sentence was based on the unique aspects of the defendant's crime and personal history. Instead, it meant the individual predilections and
prejudices of the judge. 5 '
Another issue was the failure of indeterminate sentencing and the use
of rehabilitation as ajustification for sentencing. 52 Critics argued that the
authority of parole boards to release convicts when they were sufficiently
rehabilitated was too arbitrary and too shielded from public view, provid53
ing yet another avenue for unjust and unreviewable disparity.
The sentencing procedures themselves added to the arbitrariness and
lawlessness. "Individualized" sentences were based on information obtained quickly and from over-worked probation officers. 54 Sentencing
hearings were often short and pro forma,55 and the judge would usually
impose the sentence immediately. Noting that judges generally ruminate
at length before rendering an opinion in comparatively trivial legal matters, Judge Frankel lamented the common practice that, when imposing a
criminal sentence that will subject a person to years of incarceration,
judges imposed their judgment instantly, and from the bench, without so
much as an explanation for the sentence imposed. "The court renders no
'opinion' because it has not followed the rational steps required to create
one."56
This failure to articulate reasons behind the sentence imposed further underscored the arbitrariness and lawlessness of the sentencing system. Without articulating these reasons, the judge appears to act without
rules or the need to abide by them.57 The failure to articulate the bases
for a sentence also prevented any meaningful review of the sentence on
appeal. This failure was not necessarily a problem, since sentences could
not be reviewed on appeal. But the lack of appellate review merely com51. See id. ("[S]weeping penalty statutes allow sentences to be 'individualized'
not so much in terms of defendants but mainly in terms of the wide spectrums of
character, bias, neurosis, and daily vary encountered among occupants of the trial
bench.").
52. See Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower. A Critique
of Recent Proposalsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive"Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550,

552 (1978) (discussing limitations of rehabilitation and inability to "probe a person's psyche and predict his future behavior").
53. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U.
(2010).
54. See FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 27.
55. See id. at 37.

CHI.

L. REV. 367, 375

56. Id. at 38. This system also violated the maxim ofJustice Frankfurter that
"justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice." Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11,

14 (1954).
57. See FRANKEL supra note 7, at 39 ("The existence of a rationale may not
make the hurt pleasant or even just. But the absence, or refusal, of reasons is a
hallmark of injustice. So it requires no learning in law or political philosophy to

apprehend that the swift ukase, without explanation, is the tyrant's way. The despot is not bound by rules. He need notjustify or account for what he does.").
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pleted the tragedy: federal judges with life tenure could impose any sentence within a statutory range, which commonly ranged from zero to
twenty years.5 8 The sentence was imposed with no common embarkation
point, no common route, and very little process, either due or otherwise.
These judges would then impose their sentence articulating no justification or reasoning, all without concern of appellate review. It is little wonder that Frankel deemed this regime to be "arbitrary, cruel, and lawless." 59
III.
A.

THE RISE

OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES

The Sentencing Refon Act and CongressionalIntent

In response to the consensus that the current system of indeterminate
sentencing was not working, as well as the criticisms leveled by Judge Fran-

kel, the ABA, 60 and others, 6 ' Congress set about to revise the system. After several failed attempts, 6 2 Congress finally passed the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 (the SRA) .63
The SRA had three main objectives. First, the principal goal of the
SRA was to alleviate the problem of sentencing disparity.6 4 The primary
vehicle for accomplishing this objective was the establishment of the Sentencing Commission, which would be tasked with adopting sentencing
guidelines. 65 The sentencing guidelines would be used as a basis for all
sentences imposed in the federal courts.6 6
Second, the SRA abolished parole and indeterminate sentencing.6 7
Convicted defendants would be sentenced to a definite term of imprison58. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
59. FRANKEL, supra note 7, at x.

60. See

STANDARDS REIATING To APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, supra note

19. The committee that drafted this recommendation included several federal
judges from district courts and the courts of appeals, as well as academics like

Professor Herbert Wechsler. See id. at vii-ix.

61. See supra note 43.
62. See, e.g., S. 2699, 94th Cong. (1975) (exhibiting Congress's first attempt to
enact sentencing guidelines legislation).
63. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976.
64. See Feinberg, supra note 41, at 295. For example, a study showed that, in
the Second Circuit, punishments for identical cases could range from three to
twenty years of imprisonment. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 41 (1974) (citing
ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING
STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES 1-3 (1974)), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,

3224.
65. See Feinberg, supra note 41, at 295-96. There were three primary reasons
for having a commission, rather than Congress, draft the sentencing guidelines.
See id. at 297. "First ... Congress had neither the necessary time nor expertise" to
develop something as complex as sentencing guidelines. Id. Second, there was a
concern that Congress, subject to the pressures of politics, would substantially increase criminal sentences. See id. Finally, there was a real question as to whether
congressionally-drafted guidelines could ever gain the full support of the Senate
and House of Representatives. See id.
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2012).
67. See Feinberg, supra note 41, at 296.
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ment or other punishment, and they would serve the entire sentence imposed by the judge. 68 This effort would restore "truth in sentencing," or
so the saying went.69 Related to this goal was the removal of rehabilitation
as a rationale for imposing a sentence. 70 Relying on Frankel's book, as
well as articles by Norval Morris and others, 7' Congress concluded that the
well-intentioned, but ultimately misguided theory of rehabilitation as a
goal of imprisonment could no longer be justified.72
Finally, the SRA provided appeal rights to both defendants and the
government.7 3 "Appellate review of criminal sentences would provide the
mechanism for assuring that a sentence deemed too harsh or too lenient
would be remedied by an appellate court .... ."7 In so doing, Congress
established that sentencing is a legal question, subject to review.75
The SRA is divided into two sets of provisions. The first, in title 28,
sections 991 through 998 of the United States Code, sets forth the makeup, powers, and duties of the Sentencing Commission. 76 The most significant provisions are in section 994, which requires the Commission to "promulgate and distribute to all courts of the United States" guidelines "for
use of a sentencing court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a
criminal case." 77 The second set, in title 18, sections 3551 through 3559 of
68. See id. Offenders would, however, be eligible for a limited amount of
good-time credit, which was also drastically reduced over prior practice. See 18
U.S.C. § 3624(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
69. See Feinberg, supra note 41, at 296; see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 54, 56

(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3237, 3239.
70. See Feinberg, supra note 41, at 297-98.
71. See NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); see also FRANCIS
A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL
PURPOSE (1981); DoucLAs LIPTON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL
TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIEs (1975); ANDREW VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); Robert Martinson,

What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, PUB. INTEREST, Spring
1974, at 22.
72. See Feinberg, supra note 41, at 297-98.
73. See id. at 296-97.

74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See 28 U.S.C.
77. Id.

§ 994.

§§ 991-998 (2012).

The Commission was instructed to consider, inter alia:

(1) the grade of the offense;
(2) the circumstances under which the offense was committed which
mitigate or aggravate the seriousness of the offense;
(3) the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense, including
whether it involved property, irreplaceable property, a person, a
number of persons, or a breach of public trust;
(4) the community view of the gravity of the offense;
(5) the public concern generated by the offense;
(6) the deterrent effect a particular sentence may have on the commission of the offense by others; and
(7) the current incidence of the offense in the community and in the
Nation as a whole.

Id.
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the United States Code, sets forth the matters the judge should consider
when imposing a sentence. Most significantly, section 3553(a) requires a
sentencing court to consider factors such as the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.7 8 Section 3553(a) also sets forth the penal philosophies that a court should
consider, while notably not choosing between the varying, and often conflicting, philosophies. 79 Judges are to consider:
[T] he need for the sentence imposed- to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant; and to provide the defendant with
needed .

.

8
. medical care, or other correctional treatment.

0

The Sentencing Commission then undertook the herculean task of
writing comprehensive guidelines applicable to every criminal sentence.
Working from the time of its appointment on October 29, 1985, until
April 13, 1987, the Commission studied the sentences imposed in 10,000
actual cases. 8 ' In developing the Guidelines, it attempted to follow what
was "typical past practice," and imposed sentences that were the average of
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). The factors courts were required to consider include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable
category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines
(5) any pertinent policy statement
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
Id.
79. See id. § 3553(a) (2).
80. Id.
81. See Stephen Breyer, The FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 7 (1988). Actually, the Commission
analyzed 10,000 "augmented presentence reports" and the ensuing sentences. See
Daniel J. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: UnacceptableLimits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1743 (1992). Thus, the Commission
drafted the Guidelines "in a partial vacuum, based primarily on prison sentence
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these prior sentences. 82 However, the Commission did not even attempt
to fully differentiate between all offenders and offenses: "Punishment, as
the Commission came to see, is more of a blunderbuss than a laser beam.
An effort to make fine distinctions among criminal behaviors is like a statistician running out crude statistics to ten decimal places, giving an impression of precision that is false."8 3
Using a detailed set of rules, tables, and adjustments that look at the
entire conduct of a convicted defendant, the Guidelines produce a numerical score, or offense level, that translates into a range of months of imprisonment. For tax cases, most defendants are sentenced under section
2T1.1, and the sentence is based primarily on the amount of the tax
evaded, or "tax loss,"84 with adjustments for more sophisticated tax crimes
and for crimes that involve illegally-derived income.8 5
B.

Problems with the Guidelines

Problems with the Guidelines were raised almost immediately after
their adoption.86 The criticisms leveled at the Guidelines were the result
of problems in both design and implementation.8 7 First, the system that
Congress created shifted to prosecutors the power that was formally in the
hands of sentencing judges. Since the Guidelines were mandatory and
statistics and presentence reports, omitting consideration of the judgment and
thinking processes of the judges who produced those sentences." Id. at 1744.
82. See Breyer, supra note 81, at 7. Breyer noted, however, that in certain
cases, like white collar crime cases, the Commission increased the severity of
sentences imposed over prior practice. See id. at 7 n.49. Indeed, under pre-Guidelines practice, roughly half of all tax defendants were sentenced to probation without imprisonment. This Guideline drastically curtailed the number of pure
probationary sentences.
83. Id. at 14.
84. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1 (c) (1) (2012) (defining,
for many tax related penalties, tax loss as loss that would have resulted had offense
been successfully completed).
85. See JOHN A. TOWNSEND, LARRY A. CAMPAGNA, STEVE JOHNSON & Scorr A.
SCHUMACHER, TAX CRIMES 301-08 (2008) (discussing application of Guidelines in
tax cases).
86. See, e.g., Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the Promulgation of Sentencing Guidelines by the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, reprinted in
52 Fed. Reg. 18, 121 (May 13, 1987) (stating that final Sentencing Guidelines
adopted by Commission subverted its "ultimate goal" of drafting "a rational sentencing system"); Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Centuiy?, 66 TEX.

L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (arguing that Guidelines adopted by Sentencing Commission
are "unlikely to bring rationality and uniformity to federal criminal sentencing").
See generally, A. VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGER-

(1985).
87. See Robinson, supra note 86, at 4. There were other problems with the
Guidelines that were attributable neither to the SRA nor the work of the CommisOUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS

sion. Most notable were the continuing meddling of Congress in sentencing and
the repeated imposition of mandatory minimum sentences. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failureof Sentencing Guidelines: A Pleafor Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 901, 902 (1991).
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fact-driven, and since prosecutors are largely in control of sentencing
facts, prosecutors were often able to dictate the sentence that was imposed.8 8 More fundamentally, the Commission and the Guidelines are
"an expression of confidence in the administrative state: the idea that 'experts' insulated from politics are well suited (and sometimes best suited)
to make important public choices."8 9 This belief in the omniscience or
omnicompetence of the Commission influenced the Commission's work,
as well as sentencing judges' reactions to the Guidelines.o
The belief in the primacy of administrative experts manifested itself
most fully when the Commission grabbed more power for itself and the
Guidelines, contrary to the statutory mandate set forth by Congress.
The primary vehicle for preventing unjust results from a too-rigid application of the Guidelines was the ability of the sentencing judge to depart
from the Guidelines.9 2 Under the SRA, the sentencing judge would first
consider the factors set forth in section 3553 (a), including the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the purposes of sentencing.93 The judge was then required,
under section 3553(b), to determine the Guideline range and to decide
whether a sentence within the Guideline range was appropriate, or
whether a sentence outside the range was more appropriate because the
Guidelines failed to adequately reflect the section 3553(a) factors. 94 Congress never intended to eliminate judges' "thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences."95 However, "the departure power never operated
as intended."9 6 The Commission substantially curtailed the ability of sentencing judges to depart, "except as explicitly authorized by the Commission itself."9 7 The Commission then sought to identify nearly every fact
that could be relevant to the imposition of a criminal sentence and to

make a rule about whether the sentencingjudge should consider it, and if
88. See Freed, supra note 81, at 1697-98 ("Guidelines are administrative handcuffs that are applied to judges and no one else. When an AUSA negotiates a
disposition by setting or reducing charges and identifying relevant facts, she effectively restricts the judge's sentencing range and, consequently, the ambit within
which upward and downward adjustments can make a difference.... The judge's
sentencing range is now tethered to the prosecutor's choice of charges and facts,
unless the probation officer's independent inquiry brings some facts into
question.").
89. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The PoliticalScience of Federal Sentencing Reforn, 58 STAN. L. REv. 235, 253 (2005).
90. See Freed, supra note 81, at 1699-1700.
91. Other problems include failing to provide for sentences of probation for
non-violent, first offenders. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) (2012).
92. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 1631,
1641 (2012).

93. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
94.
95.
96.
97.

See id. § 3553(b).
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235.
Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 92, at 1641.
Id. at 1646.
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so, how.98 In the Commission's view, it took into account all of the section
3553(a) factors in the Guidelines themselves, and thus would "prevent a
court from using it as grounds for departure."9 9
Finally, as a result of the complexity of the Guidelines, and the limited ability to depart from them, the Guidelines system created its own
disparities.10 0 Some of the disparities resulted from the policy choices
made by the Commission. 10 1 For example, the Guidelines have had a disproportionate impact on black offenders. 102 Moreover, offenders who differed significantly in their culpability, danger to the public, and risk of
recidivism were treated the same. 103 Thus, the Sentencing Commission
did not create guidelines so much as it created judicial straightjackets.
Sentencing courts were not given guidance but were required to march in
10 4
lockstep to a mandated result, regardless of the wishes of the judge.
C.

Booker and the Demise of Mandatory Guidelines

The Guidelines were challenged on constitutional grounds almost immediately after their adoption, and the Supreme Court appeared to settle
the constitutionality of the Guidelines in Mistretta v. United States. 05 However, more constitutional challenges were to come. Challenges to the federal Sentencing Guidelines were preceded by decisions involving state
98. See id. at 1648.
99. 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046, 18,050 (May 13, 1987).
100. See Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and EmpiricalFailureof the

Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REv. 85, 116 (2005).
101. See Mark Osler, Indirect Harms and Proportionality:The Upside-Down World of
FederalSentencing, 74 Miss. L.J. 1, 1-6 (2004). Osler discusses examples of the "upside-down" world of the Guidelines. Examples of these disparities include: (1) "in
child pornography cases, the sentence for an individual who sends a computer
image of 'virtual' child pornography, made without the use of actual children,
would face a sentence twice as harsh as that allowed under the Guidelines for a
defendant who actually rapes a child;" (2) a person who manufactures a counterfeit identity document is punished more harshly than the person who then uses
that same document to sneak into the country; and (3) "the punishment for pos-

sessing the weapon, which constitutes a threat, is often more severe than that for
actually using a gun in a violent crime." Id. at 4 (footnote omitted).
102. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING:
AN ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM Is ACHIEVING
THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 131-34 (Nov. 2004); see also Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
103. Schulhofer, supra note 8, at 851-70.
104. Sentencing judges retained, as mentioned, a limited ability to depart.
Some judges were more skilled than others at avoiding what they believed to be
the harsh results of certain Guidelines sentences. See Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial
judge's Reflections on Departuresfrom the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT'G
REP. 1 (1992).

105. 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (rejecting delegation doctrine and separation of
powers challenges to Sentencing Guidelines).
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sentencing guidelines. 0 6 In Apprendi v. New Jersey,'0 7 the defendant pled
guilty to various firearm offenses, which carried a maximum sentence of
ten years. However, at sentencing, the judge found that the offense was
"motivated by racial bias," and held that the hate crime enhancement applied, which authorized a twenty year sentence. 0 8 The Supreme Court
reversed on Sixth Amendment grounds, holding that "[o]ther than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."10 9 In Ring v. Arizona,"l 0 the Supreme
Court applied Apprendi to an Arizona law that authorized the death penalty if the judge found certain aggravating factors. As in Apprendi, the
Court concluded that the defendant's constitutional rights had been violated because the judge had imposed a sentence greater than the maximum that could have been imposed under state law without the
challenged factual finding.
In Blakely v. Washington,"' the Supreme Court extended the holdings
of Apprendi and Ring to Washington state's sentencing guidelines regime.
The defendant in Blakely pled guilty to second-degree kidnaping, which
carried a maximum sentence of ten years.'" 2 Under Washington's sentencing guidelines, the standard range for this crime was forty-nine to fiftythree months."13 However, after hearing the victim's description of the
kidnaping, the judge found that the defendant had acted with "deliberate
cruelty," which was one of the statutorily enumerated grounds for departure in domestic-violence cases, and sentenced the defendant to ninety
months.'" 4 Treating the standard guideline range as the "statutory maximum," the Court held that the judge's finding of "deliberate cruelty" violated the Sixth Amendment, as enumerated in Apprendi." 5 The Court
came to this conclusion despite the fact that Blakely's sentence of ninety
months was less than the ten year statutory maximum for the crime to
which he pled.116

106. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
107. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
108. See id. at 471.
109. Id. at 490 (emphasis added).

110. 536 U.S. 584, 592-93 (2002).
111. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
112. See id. at 299.
113. See id.

114. See id. at 300.
115. See id. at 303-05.
116. See id. at 303.
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Regardless of the merits of the decision, 17 Blakely meant that an attack on the federal Guidelines was inevitable.1 18 Indeed, within six
months, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker,'
a multi-part
decision with two majority opinions and four dissents that struck down the
federal Sentencing Guidelines. The first part of the majority's decision
dealt with the question of whether the Guidelines provisions allowing the
sentencing judge to base a sentence on conduct that was not found by a
jury violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 120 The Court held
that the mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines violated the
Sixth Amendment.1 2 1 Extending the curious logic in Blakely, the Court
held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial "is implicated whenever a judge seeks to impose a sentence that is not solely based on 'facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant,'"122 and then
two paragraphs later stated, "when a trial judge exercises his discretion to
select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no
right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant." 123 Thus, the Court held that it is a violation of a defendant's right
to a jury trial for the sentencing judge to base the sentence on facts not
found by the jury, unless the sentencing judge found those facts in the
exercise of his discretion.12 4 The Court believed, and stated "everyone
agrees," that if the Guidelines were merely advisory, the Sixth Amendment
issue-and apparently the logical flaw as well-would be cured. 12 5
In fashioning the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation,
the so-called "remedial majority" held that the sentencing court should
still find the facts and must consider the Guidelines, but that the Guidelines were "effectively advisory" and permitted sentencing courts to tailor
117. Blakely has come under heavy criticism. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 53,
at 418 (referring to Blakely decision as "silly" and "nearly incomprehensible"). Indeed, neither Apprendi nor the Sixth Amendment required the invalidation of the
Washington guidelines in Blakely or the federal Guidelines in Booker. Neither the
Washington guidelines nor the federal Guidelines permitted the sentencing judge
to impose a sentence above the statutory range for the crimes for which the defendant was found guilty by a jury.
118. Indeed, the second question asked during the Blakely oral argument was:
"Well, I assume that if your position were adopted it would invalidate the Federal
sentencing scheme that we have." Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (No. 02-1632), available at 2004 WL 728362.
119. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
120. See id. at 245.
121. See id. at 226-27.
122. Id. at 232.
123. Id. at 233.
124. See id. The Court does not explain, other than a citation to Williams, how
fact-finding as part of the exercise of discretion cures what it so clearly found to be
a Sixth Amendment violation. I can see no logical or constitutional basis for this
distinction, and Williams is a very shaky foundation indeed on which to base a
revised sentencing regime.
125. See id.
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the appropriate punishment to each offender. 126 The Court also excised
the portion of the SRA that called for de novo review and held that appellate courts were to review sentences for "unreasonableness." 127 However,
as others have noted, making the Guidelines merely advisory does not
change the "fundamental requirements of rational decisionmaking."1 28
After Booker, just as under the mandatory Guidelines regime, judges
find facts that determine the sentence, many of which were never found by
a jury. A sentencing judge is given a range of sentencing choices, and "a
sentence at the upper end of such a range cannot be rationally justified
unless the judge finds some fact in addition to the elements of the
crime." 129 In tax cases, juries do not make findings with respect to tax
loss, nor in drug cases do they make findings regarding the amount of
cocaine sold. Indeed, the Guidelines still permit uncharged and acquitted
conduct to be considered by the judge at sentencing. Thus, the remedy
articulated in Booker, just like the constitutional portion of the opinion, is
incompatible with the Sixth Amendment. 30
Booker left many unanswered questions with which the lower courts
have had to wrestle,' 31 the thorniest being the nature and extent of appellate review. Simply stated, if the Guidelines are not binding, and are only
advisory, can a sentence that is within statutory limits ever be a reversible
error?
Ultimately, the Supreme Court itself has had to jump back into the
fray, issuing no fewer than five opinions to clarify what it redundantly
claims to have made "pellucidly clear" in Booker.'32 First, in Rita v. United
States,'33 the Court held that when a district court sentences within the
range that the Sentencing Commission deems appropriate, the court of
appeals may presume that the sentence is reasonable. Thus, following
Rita, the courts of appeals may apply a "presumption of reasonableness" to
a sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines.134 It did not require appellate courts to apply a presumption of reasonableness, however, which will invariably lead to inconsistent appellate
review of sentences. 3 5
126. See id. at 245.
127. See id. at 259-61.
128. Bowman, supra note 53, at 439.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 440-41.
131. In his dissent in Booker, Justice Scalia warned that the opinion would
"wreak havoc on federal district and appellate courts quite needlessly, and for the
indefinite future." Booker, 543 U.S. at 313 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Given the tens of
thousands of cases that have cited Booker in the past four years, he appears to be

correct.
132. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007).
133. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
134. See id. at 347.
135. For a more extensive discussion of this issue, see infra notes 264-65 and
accompanying text.
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Then in December 2007, the Court issued its decisions in Gall v.
United States'3 6 and Kimbrough v. United States,13 7 which attempted to further resolve the extent of appellate review of sentences imposed. In Gall
the defendant had been a member of a drug conspiracy while he was in
college.SR Several months after joining the conspiracy, Gall advised his
co-conspirators that he was withdrawing from the conspiracy, and thereafter he did not sell illegal drugs of any kind. 139 He then graduated from
college, obtained gainful employment, and put his prior life of crime behind him. Several years later, he was indicted for his role in the drug
conspiracy and pleaded guilty.140 Under the Guidelines, Gall's sentencing
range was thirty to thirty-seven months of imprisonment. However, the
district court, noting both Gall's brief participation in the conspiracy and
his rehabilitation, sentenced Gall to probation for a term of thirty-six
months.141 The court of appeals reversed, holding that "a sentence
outside of the Guidelines range must be supported by a justification that is
proportional to the extent of the difference between the advisory range
and the sentence imposed."' 42 The Supreme Court reversed and rejected
the idea that a sentence outside the Guidelines range must be justified by
"extraordinary" circumstances. 143
The Supreme Court then set up the procedure by which sentencing
courts should determine and impose sentences. The sentencing court
should begin by calculating the applicable Guidelines range, noting that,
in an effort to maintain nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be
the starting point.144 Then, "after giving both parties an opportunity to
argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the district judge
should then consider all of the section 3553(a) factors to determine
whether they support the sentence requested by a party."' 4 5 In so doing,
the court "must make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented."1 46 If the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court
must "ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the
degree of the variance."1 4 7 Finally, the judge "must adequately explain
the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing."'148
136. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
137. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See Gall, 552 U.S. at 41.
See id.
See id. at 42.
See id. at 43.
Id. at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 47.
See id. at 49.
Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id.
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The Court then turned to the nature of appellate review and held
that courts of appeals must review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. 14 9 First, the reviewing court must ensure that the district
court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate the Guidelines range or failing to consider the section 3553(a) factors.
The appellate court must also "consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard."150
When conducting this review, the court ... will take into account
the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range. If the sentence is within the
Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is not required to,
apply a presumption of reasonableness. But if the sentence is
outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness. It may consider the extent of the
deviation, but must give due deference to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of
the variance.' 5 1
In Kimbrough, decided the same day as Gall, the Supreme Court addressed the situation in which it was the Guidelines themselves, rather

than the exceptional conduct of the defendant, that were the basis of a
sentence below the Guidelines range. Kimbrough had pleaded guilty to
various drug-related charges, including possession with intent to distribute
crack cocaine.1 52 Under the Guidelines, Kimbrough's sentencing range
was 228 to 270 months.1 5 3 The district court determined that a sentence
in this range "would have been greater than necessary to accomplish the
purposes of sentencing set forth in [section] 3553(a)."' 5 4 The court also
commented that the case "exemplified the disproportionate and unjust
effect that crack cocaine guidelines have in sentencing."' 5 5 The court sentenced Kimbrough to 180 months in prison.' 5 6 The Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence, holding that a sentence imposed "outside the
guidelines range is per se unreasonable when it is based on a disagreement with the sentencing disparity for crack and powder cocaine offenses."15 7 The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and held that
as long as the sentencing judge follows the requirements of Gall (i.e.,
149. See id. at 51.

150. Id.
151. Id. (citation omitted).
152. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007).
153. See id. at 92.

154. Id. at 92-93 (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted). Kimbrough would have
received a Guidelines range of 97 to 106 months had he been sentenced for an
equivalent amount of powder cocaine. See id.
156. See id.

157. United States v. Kimbrough, 174 F. App'x 798, 799 (4th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam).
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there was no procedural error and the sentence was substantively reasonable) a sentence outside the Guidelines range, even if based on a disagreement with the Guidelines themselves, is not reversible error.1 5 8
Finally, in Spears v. United States,15 9 the sentencing judge disagreed
with the powder-to-crack cocaine ratio of 100:1 set forth in the Guidelines
and sentenced the defendant using his own 20:1 ratio. 16 0 The court of
appeals reversed, holding that while sentencing judges may disagree with
the Guidelines as applied, they cannot adopt their own categorical crackpowder ratios in place of the Guidelines' ratio.' 6 ' The Supreme Court
summarily reversed the decision of the Eighth Circuit and held that sentencing courts are "entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crackcocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those
Guidelines."16 2
D.

The Application of the Guidelines Since Booker

Despite the Supreme Court's efforts, or perhaps because of them, the
courts of appeals are still unclear as to the nature of the review of sentencing decisions.16 3 Part of this ambiguity is the lack of clarity in standards
like "abuse-of-discretion" and "substantively reasonable." However, this
uncertainty also stems from the confusion and lack of clarity at the Supreme Court level.1 64 This section will discuss some of the appellate cases
that illustrate this confusion.
In United States v. Tomko,16 5 the Third Circuit struggled to apply the
principles set out by the Supreme Court in determining whether the sentencing judge abused his discretion in imposing a sentence with no term
of imprisonment in a tax evasion case.1 66 The stipulated tax deficiency in
Tomko was $228,557, which would have resulted in a Guidelines range of
twelve to eighteen months of incarceration.1 6 7 However, the district court
did not impose a term of imprisonment but instead sentenced Tomko to
250 hours of community service and three years of probation.' 6 8 The
158. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110-11.
159. 555 U.S. 261 (2009).
160. See id. at 262.
161. See id. at 262-63.
162. Id. at 265-66.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (en
banc); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc); United
States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc).
164. See infra notes 260-68 and accompanying text.
165. 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
166. The original panel decision in Tomko was issued on August 20, 2007. See
United States v. Tomko, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007), rev'd en banc, 562 F.3d 558
(3d Cir. 2009). The en banc decision was not issued until April 17, 2009. The
court of appeals, in a thirty-four page opinion, split eight to five on whether the
sentence should be upheld. See Tomho, 562 F.3d at 574-75.
167. See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 561.
168. See id. at 563.
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court imposed the lighter sentence because (1) Tomko had only a "negligible criminal history;" (2) his company employed more than 300 people,
and Tomko's incarceration would jeopardize their employment; and (3)
Tomko's record of charitable works.' 6 9
On appeal, a divided en banc court agreed on the general standard to
be imposed. Quoting extensively from Gall, both the majority and dissent
agreed that their review of the sentence should be in two stages. First, the
court of appeals must ensure that the sentencing court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the section 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.17 0 Assuming there was no procedural error, the court of appeals
must then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, which
requires the court to look at the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the sentence.'17 Finally, the court of appeals should review both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed for an
abuse of discretion.
However, the majority and dissent disagreed as to the degree of deference to be given. The majority held that "if the district court's sentence is
procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing
court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant
for the reasons the district court provided."17 2 While the majority was
quick to point out that it did not necessarily agree with the sentence imposed, it was unwilling to disturb what it considered to be fact-bound inquiries that are better suited for a sentencing judge to make.173 The
majority thus confined its review to whether the sentencing judge considered the section 3553(a) factors, holding that "[t]he touchstone of 'reasonableness' is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and
meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)." 7 4
In so doing, the majority seemed to reserve little for itself in the way
of substantive review. Indeed, the majority's "touchstone of reasonableness"-and therefore its view of the substantive reasonableness of the sentence-only examines the procedural soundness of the sentence: whether
169. See id. at 562-64.
170. Id. at 567 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)).
171. See id.
172. Id. at 568.
173. See id. at 560. The majority noted "'[tihe sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual
case.'" Id. at 561 (alteration in original) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). The majority also noted that, "'district courts have an institutional advantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations, especially as they see so many
more Guidelines sentences than appellate courts do.'" Id. at 566 (quoting Gal4
552 U.S. at 52).
174. Id. at 575 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Grier, 475
F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007)).
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the record "reflects rational and meaningful consideration" of the section
3553(a) factors. 1 5 Under the majority's deferential approach to appellate
review, it is unclear under what circumstances the court would find a procedurally sound sentence substantively unreasonable.
The dissent undertook a more substantive review of the sentence imposed and the reasons given for the sentence. Purporting to use the same
abuse-of-discretion standard of review as the majority, the dissent examined the reasons articulated by the sentencing judge for imposing a
sentence well below the Guidelines range. The dissent also found support
in the opinions of other courts of appeals and argued that even though it
will give due deference to the district court's decision that the section
3553(a) factors justify the extent of the variance, a reviewing court may
nevertheless "find that a district court has abused its considerable discretion if it has weighed the factors in a manner that demonstrably yields an
unreasonable sentence."17 6
In analyzing the factors the sentencing court relied on in imposing
the sentence, the dissent opined that a negligible criminal history did not
support the variance "because Tomko's status as a 'first-time offender'
[did] not differentiate him from many, if not most, tax evaders."' 7 7 Likewise, the dissent found that Tomko's employment record failed to distinguish him from other tax evaders. Many white-collar criminals run
successful businesses, hence the desire to evade taxes. The dissent believed that the prospect of the business failing should not be considered as
a mitigating factor, particularly "when the business itself was the vehicle
through which the defendant perpetrated the crime."1 7 8 Finally, while
the dissent acknowledged that Tomko's charitable works, however welltimed, might justify some downward variance, they were not sufficient to
support the degree of variance in this case. Thus, according to the dissent, only one out of the three reasons offered by the sentencing judge for
the extraordinary variance justified a downward variance.1 79
In addition, the dissent noted that the "mitigating" circumstances relied upon by the sentencing court only addressed one of the section
3553(a) factors, and the judge failed to emphasize other factors, including
the nature, circumstances, and seriousness of the offense.o80 The dissent
noted that Tomko did much more than just fail to report income. Rather,
he developed a sophisticated plan to evade taxes that spanned several
175. Id. (quoting Grier, 475 F.3d at 571).

176. Id. at 578-79 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515
F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)); see also United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180,

191 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Taylor, 532 F.3d 68, 69-70 (1st Cir.
2008); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 265 (4th Cir. 2008).
177. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 583 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 261 (3d Cir. 2007)).
178. Id. at 584 (citing United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1424 (3d Cir.
1994); United States v. Sharapan, 13 F.3d 781, 785 (3d Cir. 1994)).
179. See id. at 585.
180. See id. at 585-86.
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years and required planning, coordination, and coercion of numerous
subcontractors. The dissent thus determined that not only did the sentencing judge's justifications for imposing Tomko's sentence fail to differentiate him from other tax evaders, but also "the severity of his offense
and the extent of his culpability, as evidenced by the willful and brazen
nature of his conduct, remove Tomko's tax evasion from the garden variety type."18 1 Finally, the dissent noted the "perverse irony" of sentencing
Tomko to "home confinement in the very mansion that was built through
the fraudulent tax evasion scheme at issue . .. [a] house on approximately
eight acres, with a home theater, an outdoor pool and sauna, a full bar,
$1,843,500 in household furnishings, and $81,000 in fine art."18 2
In United States v. Cavera,183 the defendant pled guilty to a firearms
trafficking offense. The district court sentenced him to a longer sentence
than was called for by the Guidelines, "simply because [it thought] the
sentencing guidelines may understate the seriousness of this offense because of the consequences for the community of bringing or transporting ... firearms into New York City." 184 A divided en banc Second Circuit
wrestled with the question of whether the district court's use of information that did not pertain to the individual defendant, but only to perceived
geographical and sociological differences, was reasonable.18 5 The majority noted that, after Kimbrough, a sentencing judge "may vary from the
Guidelines range based solely on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines .. ."186 The majority held that it would not substitute its own judgment for the district court's on the question of what is sufficient to meet
the section 3553(a) factors and that it will "set aside a district court's substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court's18de7
cision 'cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions. "'
One of the dissents argued that "[w] here a district court's sociological
and statistical findings, as to which it enjoys no special comparative advantage vis-a-vis the Sentencing Commission, do not reasonably follow from
the evidence it cites, the court exceeds its allowable discretion and the
sentence is unreasonable."18 8 Judge, now Justice, Sotomayor, in her own
dissenting opinion, decried the:
181. Id. at 586.
182. Id. at 587.

183. 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc).
184. Id. at 185 (second alteration in original).
185. Caveracontained a majority opinion, two concurring opinions, two opinions that concurred in part and dissented in part, and one dissenting opinion. See
id.
186. Id. at 191.

187. Id. at 189 (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir.
2007)).
188. Id. at 212 (Straub, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted).
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[M]ajority's excessive deference to the district court's decision,
which risks a regression of the sentencing process to the "greatest
deficiencies of the pre-Guidelines regime," namely "its failure to
provide for review of the decisions of sentencing judges and its
failure to ensure that the sentencing judge's exercise of discre18 9
tion was informed by authoritative criteria and principles."
She warned that "[a]ppellate courts must not abdicate their responsibility
to ensure that sentences are based on sound judgment, lest we return to
the 'shameful' lack of parity, which the Guidelines sought to remedy."190
In United States v. Feemster,19 i a divided en banc Eighth Circuit ad-

dressed the scope of its appellate review.1 92 After remanding the sentence
twice, the court reviewed a drug sentence for a third time. The sole issue
was whether the district court had adequately explained the basis for a
reduction from a 360 month Guidelines sentence to 120 months. The
dissent
'
majority held that the judge's explanations were sufficient.19 3 The
disagreed, and asserted that the majority's review was essentially:
[A] standard of no appellate review at all. We adopt a posture
today that is so deferential that, so long as the district court gives
lip service and a bit of discussion to the relevant 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors, a sentence will almost never be reversed, procedurally or otherwise.19 4
There are other cases that struggle with the standard of review after
GalL19 5 What is significant about these cases is that, despite numerous
attempts, the Supreme Court has failed to articulate a workable standard
of review. If panels of courts of appeals cannot even agree on what the
standard of review is, or how it is to be applied, sentencing judges will be
further at-sea in discerning the amount of discretion they have in imposing sentences. Also, the majority of courts appear to be granting almost
unlimited discretion to sentencing judges, which is contrary to the intent
of Congress in the SRA and ignores the problems of the past.
With more discretion came more variance from the Guidelines:
189. Id. at 217 (Sotomayor,

J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(quoting Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, judging Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1247, 1253-54 (1997)).
190. Id. at 224 (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 65 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3248).

191. 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
192. Feemster contains a majority opinion, two concurring opinions, and one
dissenting opinion. See id.

193. See id. at 463-64.
194. Id. at 471 (Beam, J., dissenting).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179
(11th Cir. 2008).
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PERCENTAGE OF CASES SENTENCED WITHIN GUIDELINES1 9 6

Year

Total

Tax

Fraud

Drugs1 9 7

Year

Total

Tax

Fraud

Drugs

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

66.3
64.9
64.5
64.1
65.0
69.4
72.1
70.9

75.4
74.1
71.2
66.2
63.2
62.6
69.3
71.6

75.5
72.3
68.6
70.7
71.2
74.8
76.0
75.7

95.9
93.8
93.0
92.9
95.2
88.8
95.8
91.4

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

61.7
60.8
59.4
56.8
55.0
54.5
52.4

54.7
47.5
44.1
37.7
35.5
37.4
36.9

64.4
64.6
61.9
58.5
55.5
54.6
50.4

93.2
90.9
89.6
90.0
94.9
94.9
97.4

As this chart shows, while the overall sentences within the applicable
Guidelines range declined, the tax sentences within the Guidelines declined much more dramatically. The fact that more than sixty percent of
post-Booker sentences in tax cases now fall outside the Guidelines range
demonstrates that there is substantially more disparity in tax cases postBooker.198 The question then becomes whether this disparity is warranted,
which Congress presumably would support, or unwarranted, which the
SRA was enacted to prevent.19 9
Whether disparity in sentences is warranted cannot be answered in
the absolute. Whether a difference in treatment of two offenders is warranted will depend upon the individual facts of each case. Indeed, it is the
failure to recognize this fundamental premise that caused the Guidelines,
in their obsessively rigid constraint ofjudges, to be unworkable. If ajudge
does not impose a Guidelines sentence, it does not mean that the sentence
is more just or more appropriate. It only means that the judge imposed an
individualized sentence. While an individualized sentence might, in the
abstract, be better than a cookie-cutter one, this would not be the case if
sentences were based on inappropriate criteria or the judge incorrectly
applied appropriate criteria.

IV.

ENSURING A

MORE

JUST SENTENCE

In the past 100 years, the sentencing pendulum has swung from unfettered discretion and indeterminate sentencing, to detailed and
mandatory guidelines, and now to guidelines-with-discretion. The new,
more balanced approach to sentencing appears to be an improvement,
196. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATIsTIcS tbl.27 (1998-2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Researchand
Statistics/AnnualRep-andSourcebooks/Archives.cfm.
197. The "Drugs" columns refer to drugs-simple possession. See id.

198. Of course, the possibility remains that all tax sentences have been uniformly reduced and there is no disparity. While data is not available to disprove
this possibility, it seems unlikely.

199. See Feinberg, supra note 41, at 295.
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and, indeed, many people believe that to be the case.2 00 However, the
current system is far from perfect. As detailed above, despite nearly eight
years of Supreme Court and other appellate decisions on the scope of
appellate review, there is no consensus among the courts on this issue. In
fact, there is often no agreement within many circuits. Moreover, the postBooker system allows for a judge to disregard the Guidelines and substitute
the judge's own penal philosophy for that of the Sentencing Commission.
Thus, the sentencing system we have now is less like H. L. A. Hart's game
of cricket with an official scorer and is more like the game of "scorer's
discretion."2 0 1 There are rules, but only if the judge chooses to follow
them; and there is appellate review, which really only amounts to ensuring
that the judge purposefully followed-or ignored-the rules.
It is clear that the number of sentences outside the Guidelines has
increased significantly since Booker.202 Sentences imposed outside the
2 03
An excesGuidelines may, in many cases, be a positive development.
sively rigid Guidelines system leads to its own kind of disparity, and some
have argued that the problem of disparity prior to the Guidelines was overblown in the first place. 20 4 Nevertheless, the problems with the pre-Guidelines, "lawless" system described by Judge Frankel were real, and the
200. See, e.g., Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 92, at 1633-34 ("The advisory
guidelines system has broad support: the vast majority of federal judges believe
that advisory guidelines achieve the purposes of sentencing better than any kind of
mandatory guidelines system or no guidelines at all, the Criminal Law Committee
of the Judicial Conference of the United States supports the advisory guidelines
system, prosecutors prefer advisory guidelines to other available options, and the
organized public and private defense bars support the advisory guidelines system."
(footnotes omitted)).
201. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 141-47 (Penelope A. Bulloch &
Joseph Raz eds., 2d ed. 1994). Hart analogizes the law and judges' role in the law
to a game of cricket or baseball played first without, and then with, an official
scorer. See id. The players can predict what the scorer's ruling will be because they
know and have used the rules, and because the scorer will, in the vast majority of
the cases, follow the rules. See id. at 143-44. Applying this analogy to law, judges
have considerably more discretion than official scorers in a game, but they nevertheless are bound by laws, constitutions, and rules. See id. at 145. Hart warns that
these "standards could not indeed continue to exist unless most of the judges of
the time adhered to them, for their existence at any given time consists simply in
the acceptance and use of them as standards of correct adjudication." Id.; see also
Scott A. Schumacher, MacNiven v. Westmoreland and Tax Advice: Using "Purposive
Textualism" to Deal with Tax Shelters and Promote Legitimate Tax Advice, 92 MARQ. L.
REv. 33, 72-73 (2008).
202. See supra note 196 and accompanying table.
203. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
204. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 471 n.15 (8th Cir. 2009)
(Beam,J., dissenting) ("I firmly believe, based upon almost five years of experience
as a federal trial judge and the sentencing, pre-Guidelines, of at least 500 federal
felons, that the 'disparity principle,' advanced by advocates as the foundation and
bedrock underlying federal guideline sentencing, is an illusion, by at least half.
Virtually every individual presents a different picture to a careful and conscientious sentencing judge. As a result, alleged uniformity is often disparity, viewed
through a different prism.").
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potential for abuse cannot be ignored. As Professor Bowman noted,
"[s]hould the Booker system survive, the exercise of the added judicial discretion might secure better outcomes for some defendants, but it would
also inevitably create more interjudge and interdistrict disparity." 205
In order to form a more perfect sentencing system, the sentencing
regime should be modified to include three elements. First, just like the
current system, there must be a set of guidelines that are the starting point
for every sentence. Second, similar to the current system, judges should
be required to impose a sentence that is adapted to the individual offender. However, this individualized determination should not be left to
the unfettered and unguided discretion of the sentencingjudge with only
the vague standards listed in section 3553. Rather, each guidelines section
should contain matters that are relevant and pertinent to individualizing a
particular offender's sentence. Finally, in order to ensure that the sentencing judge imposes the sentence correctly, the system must allow for
real, substantive appellate review. Discretion assumes power, and power
presupposes abuse of that power, or at least the ability to do so. 2 0 6 Thus,
while guidelines and a common starting point, as well as the ability to
deviate from those guidelines, are essential to a just system, real appellate
review is necessary to quell the inevitable abuse of discretion. I will take
each of these three proposals in turn.
A.

The Sentence Must Reflect the Culpability of the Offender

Both the problems with the sentencing regime and the problems with
the appellate standard of review stem from a lack of coherent philosophy
underlying sentencing. 207 The philosophical bases upon which society
punishes wrongdoers have bedeviled philosophers, scholars, and judges
for centuries. 208 While a full exploration of this subject is beyond the
scope of this Article, there are essentially five traditional theories for which
punishment may be imposed: deterrence, retribution, just deserts, rehabil205. Bowman, supra note 89, at 257.
206. See, e.g., Christine Mai-Due, judge in Rape Case Criticizedfor Light Sentence,
Remarks About Victim, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/

2013/aug//nation/la-na-montana-judge-20130829 (imposing thirty-day sentence
on former high school teacher for raping fourteen year-old student who later com-

mitted suicide). The judge stated that the victim was "older than her chronologi-

cal age," and that she was "as much in control of the situation" as her teacher. Id.
207. These two sets of problems are, of course, interrelated. It is because
there is no coherent and consistent view of sentencing that appellate courts strug-

gle with the nature and extent of appellate review. Likewise, since there is no
consistent or coherent view of appellate review, sentencing courts struggle with the

amount of authority they have in sentencing.
208. See, e.g., Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 117 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1972); R.A. DuFF & STUART GREEN, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAw (2011); H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM:
STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY (1982); PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISH-

MENT (Robert M. Baird & Stuart Rosenbaum eds., 1988); Matthew A. Pauley, The
Jurisprudenceof Crime and Punishmentfrom Plato to Hegel, 39 Am. J. JuRis. 97 (1994).
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itation, and incapacitation. 20 9 Notably, and problematically, Congress did
not resolve the debate regarding which of the purposes of sentencing
should be primary. 2 10 Indeed, Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission and sentencing judges to consider each of these purposes in sentencing. 21 1 In order for a sentencing regime not to be all things to all
people (or all judges), there must be a coherent-and consistent-system
of sentencing. Without a coherent system, disparity, both warranted and
unwarranted, is inevitable. 212
1.

Two Theories of Punishment, One Sentencing System

The five theories of punishment noted above can be divided into two
overarching theories: the utilitarian theory and the retributivist theory.
Utilitarians maintain that punishment is only justified if the benefits to
society outweigh the harm caused to the person punished.2 1 3 Utilitarians
therefore rely on deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation to justify
punishment. 2 14 Retributivists focus on the conduct of the offender injustifying punishment. It is because that person did something wrong and
violated the law that the person is being punished. 2 15 Thus, the theories
advanced by the retributivist are retribution and just deserts.
For many legal theorists, these two theories of punishment were irreconcilable. 2 16 However, more recently, John Rawls and H. L. A. Hart each
reconciled the utilitarian and retributivist theories into one coherent sentencing structure. In his influential work, Two Concepts of Rules, Rawls argued that in justifying punishment there are two questions: why do we
punish at all, and why do we punish this particular person?2 17 The utilitarian theory answers the first question, while the retributivist theory answers
the second.2 18 Rawls then asserts that each of these questions, as well as
their answers, is relevant at different times in the sentencing proceeding:
The answer, then, to the confusion engendered by the two views
of punishment is quite simple: one distinguishes two offices, that
209.

ROBERT

M. BAIRD

& STUART E. ROSENBAUM,

PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT

8-9 (1988).

210. This problem is not new to the SRA. AsJudge Frankel stated regarding
the pre-Guidelines state of the law, "Congress and state legislatures have failed
even to study and resolve the most basic of the questions affecting criminal penalties, the questions of justification and purpose." FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 7.
211. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
212. I realize that with politics being what it is, it is perhaps naive to think that
Congress and its multitude of members and viewpoints could ever articulate one
coherent view on anything, let alone on sentencing. Indeed, as Frankel noted,
Congress is not a philosopher's grove. FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 62.
supra note 209, at 8.

213.

BAIRD & ROSENBAUM,

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Rawls, supra note 12, at 38-39.
Id.
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of the judge and that of the legislator, and one distinguishes
their different stations with respect to the system of rules which
make up the law; and then one notes that the different sorts of
considerations which would usually be offered as reasons for
what is done under the cover of these offices can be paired off
with the competing justifications of punishment. One reconciles
the two views by the time-honored device of making them apply
to different situations. 2 19
Hart espoused a similar theory.2 20 The Rawls and Hart model is the ideal
framework for the application of the Guidelines after Booker. The general
focus of the Guidelines should be utilitarian, with deterrence, incapacitation, and, to a certain extent, rehabilitation as the justifying principles.
Thus, in tax cases, the initial Guidelines determination should be based, as
is currently the case, on deterring others. In this regard, the introductory
commentary to section 2T1.1 provides:
The criminal tax laws are designed to protect the public interest
in preserving the integrity of the nation's tax system. Criminal
tax prosecutions serve to punish the violator and promote respect for the tax laws. Because of the limited number of criminal
tax prosecutions relative to the estimated incidence of such violations, deterring others from violating the tax laws is a primary consideration underlying these guidelines. Recognition that the
sentence for a criminal tax case will be commensurate with the
gravity of the offense should act as a deterrent to would-be
violators. 22 1
In its legislative capacity, the Sentencing Commission rightly focused on
deterrence as the primary justification for tax prosecutions. Indeed, the
introductory commentary is a perfect answer to the question of why we
prosecute tax evaders.
But "tax loss calculations," "preserving the integrity of the tax system,"
and "deterrence" do not fully justify why we punish a particulartax evader,
nor should a sentencing judge be bound by the rough-and-ready tax loss
calculation. 222 The answer to why we punish a particular defendant requires the judge to focus on the retributivistjustifications. This is particu219. Id. at 39-40.
220. See Hart, supra note 12, at 16.
221. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1, introductory cmt. (2012)
(emphasis added).
222. See Rawls, supra note 12, at 38-39; see also United States v. Cavera, 550
F.3d 180, 192 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (noting that many Guidelines sentences,
including tax offenses, drastically vary based only on amount of money involved).
However, "a district court may find that even after giving weight to the large or
small financial impact, there is a wide variety of culpability amongst defendants
and, as a result, impose different sentences based on the factors identified in
§ 3553(a)." Id.
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larly appropriate in tax cases, where often the sole difference between
legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion is the mental state (i.e., the
culpability) of the defendant. 22 3
An example of this application is the case of Mary Estelle Curran.22 4
Curran was prosecuted for failing to disclose Swiss bank accounts that she
had inherited from her husband, which held as much as $43 million. 225
Curran had hired a lawyer to disclose the accounts, but the lawyer did not
file the proper paperwork until after the government already had her
name from the bank.2 2 6 Under the section 2T1.1 calculation, Curran
faced a sentence of thirty to thirty-seven months. However, the defense
presented evidence that Curran was a seventy-nine year-old widow, she was
financially unsophisticated, and that she relied on her attorneys and her
deceased husband regarding the tax treatment of this account.2 27 Deeming the prosecution a "tragic situation," the district court judge sentenced
Curran to one year of probation, but then immediately revoked it, effectively sentencing her to probation for less than a minute.2 28 Thus, the
judge relied on both Curran's lack of culpability and her age in dramatically lowering her sentence below the suggested Guidelines range.
By the same token, some tax evaders may be more culpable than their
tax loss score would indicate and should therefore receive a harsher sen229
tence. A noteworthy example of this situation is United States v. Ciccolini.
Ciccolini embezzled $1,038,680 from a charitable organization of which
he was the director. 230 Not only did he embezzle funds from a charity, he
structured the deposits of the embezzled funds by making 139 separate
deposits of less than $10,000 each. 23 ' He also filed false tax returns for
multiple years and underreported his tax liabilities by $292,136.232 Thus,
this is a case in which the individual was more culpable than the gardenvariety tax evader. The judge appeared to recognize this understanding.
The Presentence Report recommended a total offense level of fifteen,
with a range of eighteen to twenty-four months. However, the district
223. See, e.g., Scott A. Schumacher, Magnifying Deterrence by Prosecuting Professionals, 89 IND. L.J. 511 (2014).
224. See Susannah Nesmith & David Voreacos, Widow Gets Less than Minute of
Probation in U.S. Tax Case, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 25, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://

www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-25/widow-gets-less-than-minute-of-probationin-u-s-tax-case.html.
225. See id.
226. See id.

227. See Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum in Support of a Sentence of
Probation at 2-3, United States v. Curran, 9:12-cr-80206-KLR (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19,
2013), available at http://mediajournalofaccountancy.com/JOA/Docs/
Curran-brief.pdf.
228. See Nesmith & Voreacos, supra note 224.
229. 491 F. App'x 529 (6th Cir. 2012).
230. See id. at 530-31.
231. See id. at 531. Ciccolini made deposits in this manner to avoid certain
currency reporting requirements. See id.

232. See id.
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court found that Ciccolini had testified falsely during his plea colloquy,
and the court found that the source of funds for both the structuring and
tax counts were the proceeds of illegal activity. 233 As a result, the judge
determined a total offense level of twenty-six, with a range of sixty-three to
seventy-eight months.23 4 Notably, while the judge appeared to correctly
determine the defendant's Guidelines score, he did not vary above the
Guidelines range based upon the defendant's abhorrent behavior, perhaps believing that the Guidelines sentence was appropriate. But in fashioning the individualized sentence, the judge did not determine the
sentence based upon Ciccolini's culpability.2 35 Rather, the judge relied
on the writings of a "Nobel-winning economist," who argued that in financial crimes, "incarceration is less important than providing a disincentive
to others and that the disincentive can sometimes be obtained through
financial penalties." 236 The judge imposed a sentence of one day of incarceration, followed by three years of supervised release, and he ordered
restitution of $3,500,000.237
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit determined that the judge had no authority to order restitution and reversed the entire sentence, because
sentences are "a package of sanctions" and the restitution portion of the
sentence was the means by which the judge sanctioned the seriousness of
the defendant's conduct. 238 Significantly, the court of appeals did not remonstrate the sentencing judge for employing a penal philosophy so at
odds with the Guidelines.
2.

InstitutionalizingIndividuality

Following Booker, sentencing courts, after they calculate the Guidelines range, are required to consider the section 3553(a) factors and
"make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented."2 39 As
indicated, the section 3553(a) factors include "the nature and circumstances of the offense," the need for the sentence imposed to "reflect the
seriousness of the offense," the need "to afford adequate deterrence," and
the need "to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant." 240
Of course, many of these factors were already considered by the Sentencing Commission in fashioning the Guidelines range. 2 4' More significantly, some of these factors have nothing whatsoever to do with the
233. See id.
234. See id.

235. See id. at 531-32.
236. Id. at 531.
237. See id. at 532.
238. Id. at 534 (quoting Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1251
(2011)).
239. United States v. Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).

240. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1)-(2) (2012).
241. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)-(d) (2012).
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individual facts of a given case.2 4 2 Thus, it is relevant to the individual
sentence that Gall abandoned the drug conspiracy and turned his life
around well prior to his conviction. However, it is irrelevant for purposes
of imposing an individualized sentence that the judge in Kimbrough believed the crack-powder cocaine ratio was unjust. That judge would presumably reach the same sentence in every crack cocaine prosecution and
not just in the case of Kimbrough. 243 Likewise, it is relevant for purposes
of imposing an individualized sentence that Curran was elderly and unsophisticated. However, it is irrelevant for imposing an individualized sentence that the judge in Ciccolini believes deterrence in white collar crime
cases is best served by imposing a large fine in lieu of imprisonment. Yet,
the current system allows judges to make these so-called individualized determinations that are not based on factors unique to the individual case at
all.
In order for a sentence to be properly individualized, section 3553
should be amended to limit the factors thatjudges may consider in varying
or departing from the Guidelines. Those factors should include the particular facts of the defendant's personal, family, and business situation
and, significantly, should focus on the relative culpability of the defendant. The impact of the personal circumstances of the defendant, including family situation; physical condition or impairment, and age;
charitable, public, or military service; diminished capacity, and mental or
emotional conditions; and post-offense rehabilitation, should be left to the
discretion of the sentencing judge.24 4 Likewise, sentencing judges should
also be permitted to vary from the Guidelines by relying on circumstances
that are unique to the defendant's case but are not necessarily personal to
the individual, including whether the Guidelines sentence will have adverse effects on employees or other innocent third-parties.2 4 5 These factors are routinely and appropriately used by courts in varying from the
Guidelines. 246
242. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (B) (instructing sentencing courts to consider need for sentence to "afford adequate deterrence").
243. Indeed, the Supreme Court appears to have accepted as a fact that the
sentencing court would have come to the same result in every case. The Court
accepted this categorical rejection of the Guidelines because, in the Court's view,
the crack-powder Guidelines were not the result of the considered judgment of the
Commission, but were the result of the requirements of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986.

244. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS, tbl. 25B [hereinafter SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT], available at http://
www.ussc.gov/Research andStatistics/Annual_Reports-andSourcebooks/2012/
Table25b.pdf.
245. See id. But see United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (sentencing defendant well below Guidelines range). The sentencing decision was made on grounds that the dissent, and I, believe are dubious; the sentence was nevertheless affirmed. Alas, no system will be perfect.

246. See SENTENCING

COMM'N

REPORT,

supra note 244.
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However, the Guidelines should also be amended to provide more
structure for judges to base sentences more explicitly on the relative culpability of the individual defendant. Section 3553 provides that the sentence
should "reflect the seriousness of the offense," 24 7 and section 994 instructs
the Sentencing Commission to fashion Guidelines that, inter alia, reflect
the "circumstances under which the offense was committed which mitigate
or aggravate the seriousness of the offense." 248 Yet, many of the Guidelines provisions focus primarily on the harm caused by the crime, but
largely ignore, or minimize, the defendant's relative culpability. 249
The tax Guidelines are a perfect example of this shortcoming. The
Guidelines sentence under 2T1.1 is driven primarily by tax loss. There is a
twelve-point difference between a tax loss of $2,000 and a loss of $200,000.
Yet, the Guidelines provide only a two-point increase for a sophisticated
means adjustment, the only specific offense characteristics adjustment that
is applicable in legal-source tax prosecutions.2 50 Moreover, this two-point
increase can be canceled out by an acceptance of responsibility adjustment, making the defendant's culpability and the manner in which the tax
loss was generated virtually irrelevant. Similarly, the Guidelines for antitrust violations are driven almost exclusively by the volume of commerce
affected by the offense. 25 1 Thus, these Guidelines focus almost exclusively
on the harm caused and largely ignore, or minimize, the relative culpability of the individual defendant.
The Guidelines should allow for a finer-grained analysis of the defendant's culpability. In this regard, the Department ofjustice has proposed
an amendment to section 2T1.1 that would permit an upward departure
where "the offense level determined under this guideline substantially understates the seriousness of the offense."252 As an example, the recommendation cites a defendant who fails to disclose an offshore bank
account that has unreported income from the account that is relatively
small in comparison with the value of the assets hidden. 253 Because of this
situation, the tax loss computation might understate the defendant's true
culpability.2 54
247. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (A).
248. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c) (2) (2012).
249. The Guidelines do allow for adjustments for the defendant's "role in the
offense," which increases the defendant's sentence if the defendant was a manager
or leader. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 311.1 (2012).
250. See id. § 2T1.1(b). There is an additional two-point increase if the income that was underreported is derived from criminal activity, like narcotics sales.
See id.

251. See id. § 2R1.1.
252. Letter from Jonathan Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy and Legislation,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to The Honorable Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n 14 (July 11, 2013), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/criminal/foia/
docs/2013annual-letter-final-071113.pdf.
253. See id.
254. See id.
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While there is a good deal of merit to this proposal, assessing the
relative culpability of the defendant should not be relegated to a departure
from the Guidelines, as if considering the defendant's culpability is an
extraordinary matter. Rather, judges should be mandated to consider that
culpability in every case. The fraud Guidelines, in section 211.1, might
provide a useful template for individualizing the Guidelines sentence
based on individual conduct and culpability of the defendant and not just
the monetary harm caused to the victim. Courts could be instructed to
consider factors like whether the tax crime occurred over multiple years,
whether the conduct was more sophisticated than the limited two-point
enhancement would provide, 255 whether the defendant was advised by a
professional, 256 and whether the defendant was part of an illegal protest
movement. Whatever is agreed upon as relevant for these purposes, the
focus should be on the culpability of the defendant that makes the defendant's conduct more serious or less serious than the Guidelines starting
point.
How is the system that I propose different from the post-Booker system
we currently enjoy? Are sentencing judges not required to start with the
Guidelines and then consider things like "the seriousness of the offense,"
"just punishment," and the defendant's need for rehabilitation in imposing their sentences? 2 5 7 In a way, yes. Butjudges are required to consider
all of the section 3553 factors, which include not only these retributivist
factors, but also deterrence, protecting the public, and promoting respect
for the law.258 Moreover, judges are given no guidance on which of these
factors they should choose from, and they are left to apply their own penal
philosophy in imposing their sentences. Thus, ajudge could rely solely on
deterrent theories in imposing the sentence, ignoring the retributivist factors.259 The system must ensure that the culpability of the individual offender forms the basis of the individualized sentence, not the penal
philosophy of the individual judge.

255. Section 2T1.1 currently only allows for a two-point increase for sophisticated means. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1(b) (2012). Sophisticated means is defined to include the use of an offshore account. See id. But
there are many gradations of sophistication from the simple ownership of an offshore account that the defendant inherited, to the use of multiple layers of entities
to hide the defendant's ownership of an offshore account.
256. Ordinarily, a defendant's reliance on the advice of a professional is a
defense to the willfulness element of tax crimes. See TOwNSEND ET AL., supra note
85, at 175. However, juries nevertheless find defendants guilty of tax crimes even
though they were advised that the conduct was acceptable. See, e.g., United States

v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 859-60 (11th Cir. 2010).
257. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012).
258. See id.
259. See, e.g., United States v. Ciccolini, 491 F. App'x 529 (6th Cir. 2012).
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Sentences Should Be Subjected to Real and Substantive Appellate Review

In order to ensure that sentencing judges correctly apply the Guidelines and correctly impose the ultimate sentence on appropriately individualized factors, sentencing decisions must be subject to robust appellate
review. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has left lower
courts with a confusing and inconsistent mandate. 260 The standard of review that the Court has articulated is "reasonableness" review. 26 1 However, the Court, in explaining what the reasonable review entails, equates
reasonableness with abuse-of-discretion. 2 62 But those two standards "are
not equivalent."26 3 In addition, the Court allows, but does not require,
courts of appeals to employ a presumption of reasonableness when the
sentence is within the Guidelines range, but does not afford that same
presumption to sentences outside of the range. Such a presumption is
contrary to the abuse-of-discretion standard the Court purports to use. 264
Permitting but not requiring courts to use this presumption also creates
inter-circuit, and perhaps inter-panel, inconsistencies by allowing courts of
appeals to decide whether they will review a Guidelines sentence more
deferentially than one outside of the Guidelines. Thus, abuse-of-discretion review could mean different things in different cases, not a usual feature of appellate review. 265
Moreover, under traditional abuse-of-discretion review, courts review
factual findings for clear error, while questions of law are reviewed de
novo.266 However, after Kimbrough, sentencing judges can disregard the
policies of the Guidelines and can develop their own sentencing regimetheir own law. As Judge Posner stated, "[i]t is apparent from Kimbrough v.
United States, that the regime created by the Booker case, which demoted
the guidelines from mandatory to advisory status, permits a sentencing
judge to have his own penal philosophy at variance with that of the Sentencing Commission." 26 7 But, developing an original penal philosophy at
variance with the Guidelines is a legal question, which ordinarily would be
subject to de novo review. 2 68 Thus, courts of appeals are to engage in "reasonableness" review, which is really abuse-of-discretion (although they are
260. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentenc-

ing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REv. 1, 13 (2008).
261. See id. at 9-10.

262. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (explaining Booker"made
it pellucidly clear that the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review now applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions"); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 351 (2007) ("[Alppellate 'reasonableness' review merely asks whether the
trial court abused its discretion . . . .").

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
omitted).
268.

Hessick & Hessick, supra note 260, at 15.
Id. at 19.
See id. at 22.
Id. at 14, n.66.
United States v. Higdon, 531 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation
See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 260, at 25.
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in fact two different standards), and the kind of abuse-of-discretion review
courts are to use bears little resemblance to traditional abuse-of-discretion
review. The following section offers a better alternative.
1.

Sentencing Decisions Should Be Subject to TraditionalAbuse-of-Discretion
Review

Determining a sentence and entering a judgment and commitment
order involve the application of law to facts. There is nothing about these
determinations that make them incapable of substantive appellate review.
In determining a sentence, judges make hard choices in reviewing evidence and must make determinations regarding credibility. But judges
make similar factual and credibility determinations in nearly every case.
Those decisions are not absolved from thorough appellate review. 269
The Rawlsian system, combining utilitarian principles at the legislative
(or Commission) level with retributivist principles left to the trial judge, is
well-suited for traditional abuse-of-discretion review. Under this system,
appellate courts would be tasked with reviewing whether the sentencing
judge correctly applied the objective, legal matters. This would entail reviewing whether the sentencing judge correctly calculated the Guidelines
range and based the sentence on a correct application of the individualized, retributivist factors. Despite the holding in Kimbrough, sentencing
judges should not be permitted, as Judge Posner explained, to develop
their "own penal philosophy at variance with that of the Sentencing Commis-

sion."270 The Guidelines, to the extent they employ utilitarian principles,
must be the starting point. To permit otherwise is simply to instill a lawless
system.
In order to prevent the abuses of the past, there should be a uniform
starting point, and then an individualized sentence, to take into account
the facts of the individual defendant's case, not the sentencing philosophy
of the individual sentencingjudge. Appellate courts would then review for
clear error whether the facts on which the judge based the individualized
sentence support the sentence imposed. Using traditional abuse-of-discretion review, where questions of law are reviewed de novo and findings of
fact are reviewed for clear error, would allow for the required uniformity
and individualization.
V.

CONCLUSION

Imposing a criminal sentence on an offender is, or at least should be,
one of the most momentous tasks ajudge undertakes. Being sentenced to
a term in prison is undoubtedly the most momentous legal judgment an
individual will endure. Subjecting these sentences to clear and identifiable legal rules and procedures that allow for both uniformity and individ269. See STANDARDS

RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES,

19, at 5.

270. Higdon, 531 F.3d at 562.

supra note
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ualization, where appropriate, is essential to a just system. We have
centuries of experience on which to draw in crafting a sentencing regime.
More recently, the SRA was enacted in response to real problems and real
abuses in a system of unfettered discretion. Less-fettered discretion is only
less bad if used appropriately, 27 1 particularly when it is paired with a seemingly unworkable standard of review.2 72 Policymakers should revisit the
SRA and craft revisions so that there is a consistent sentencing law that is
applicable to every case. Judges should not be allowed to devise and deploy their own penal system, which is in effect creating their own law.
Judges should be allowed to make appropriately individualized determinations in each case, but only if the facts of the individual case make that
case different from the mine-run case contemplated by the Commission
and the Guidelines. In this way, criminal defendants will be subject to the
same law as every other defendant, and criminal defendants will receive
the sentences they deserve.
271. See, e.g., United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495, 497-99 (4th Cir. 2010)

(sentencing defendant to eighteen months' home detention with work release and
international travel privileges, despite having committed tax evasion over sixteen
years and having paid only $480 of $2 million in taxes owed during four year interval between his guilty plea and sentencing).
272. I use the word "unworkable" because of the confusion the current stan-

dard of review appears to have engendered. See, e.g., United States v. Feemster,
572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d
Cir. 2009) (en banc); United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en
banc).

